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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
without congressional sanction. The inconclusiveness of the Regulations, the
lack of precedent, and this congressional inaction are the factors which
should have induced the court in the instant case to allow the depreciation
deduction in the year of sale.
MICHAEL L. ALTMAN
Transportation—Federal Motor Carrier Act—Statutory Interpreta-
tion.—Baggett Transfr. Co. v. United States.'--This action was brought
by a protesting motor common carrier to set aside an order of the ICC grant-
ing the applicant, H. Messick, Inc., a permit to operate as a motor vehicle
contract carrier, transporting dangerous explosives and related articles, while
under contract with the Hercules Powder Co. The Commission found that
Messick met the requirements of Section 203 (a) (15) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, by proposing to serve a limited number of shippers and to
assign motor vehicles to the exclusive use of the shipper for a continuing
period of time. Messick proposed distinctive and specialized services which
the Commission evaluated in light of the criteria enumerated in section 209 (b)
of the act. The ICC concluded that, after balancing these factors, the permit
should be granted. The district court, setting aside the order of the Com-
mission and remanding the case for further action, HELD; the Commission
erroneously assumed the criteria enumerated in section 209(b) could be
weighed in the same manner as an algebraic equation. The court concluded
that the method of attaching equal weight to every criterion was an improper
standard for the Commission to use.
In 1935, Congress enacted legislation designed to foster sound eco-
nomic conditions in the motoring industry in order to prevent further de-
structive proliferation of motor transport concerns and ruinous competition. 3
Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act4 was federal regulatory legislation
designed to promote the policy inherent in prior state-controlled regulation
of motor carriers,5 i.e., to promote the economic welfare of the carriers, ship-
pers and the public by advocating a policy of preserving existing common
carriage transportation against the inroads of contract carriage transporation.°
Regulation was designed as an alternative to completely free-entry competi-
tion. Although competition was not wholly eliminated, entrance into the in-
dustry was limited by strict controls. 1
The act distinguished between common carriers by motor vehicle ("any
person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in transporta-
tion by motor vehicle. . . .") 8 and contract carriers ("any person which
1 231 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
2 H. Messick, Inc., 92 M.C.C. 293 (1963).
3 Filing of Contracts by Contract Carriers by Motor Vehicle, 20 M.C.C. 8 (1939).
4 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1958).
Sec Hale & Hale, Competition or Control
	 Motor Carriers, 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 775 (1960).
11 See C. & D. Oil Co,, 1 M.C.C. 329, 332 (1936).
7 Hale & Hale, supra note 5, at 776.
49 Stat. 544 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (19) (1958).
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engages in [motor] transportation . . . under continuing contracts. . . .")°
The former were required to obtain certificates of public convenience and
necessity" from the Commission before commencing operations, while the
latter were required to secure permits from the same source, to be issued
if it appeared that the proposed contract operation would "be consistent
with the public interest"" and the policy declared in section 202(a). Section
202(a) was the 1935 forerunner of the National Transportation policy
adopted in 1940. As declared:
[The] ... policy of the Congress [isl to provide for fair and impar-
tial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provi-
sions of this act . . . so administered as to recognize and preserve
the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, eco-
nomical, and efficient service . . . in transportation . . . without un-
fair or destructive competitive practices. . . . 12
Although the Commission had felt that the regulations were designed to
promote and protect common carrier service," the act laid far more stringent
controls on common carriers than on contract carriers. Common carriers had
to hold themselves out to the general public under published, just and non-
discriminatory tariffs," while contract carriers were uncontrolled in their
charges above a reasonable minimum.' 5 The published "just and non-dis-
criminatory" tariffs were set at a higher rate than the "reasonable mini-
mum" tariffs which contract carriers had to charge. The Commission found
that contract carriers were abusing this rate-advantage privilege and, rather
than performing true contract services on a continuing basis, were making
oral agreements for single-haul shipments. Thus, the contract carriers were
competing directly with the common carriers, contrary to the announced
policy of Congress, and in so doing, escaped the rate-regulations and other
controlling devices applied to the common carriers. In 1937, the Commission
ruled that all contracts claimed by contract carriers to entitle them to spe-
cial status must be in writing prior to the granting of a permit)" In fact,
the Commission steadily construed the act to favor the existing carriers
"as against any person now seeking to enter the field of motor-carrier trans-
portation." 17
° 49 Stat. 551 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(15) (1958).
10 49 Stat. 551 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 30&(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1963).
11 49 Stat. 552 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1958).
12 54 Stat. 899 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Preface to § 301 (1958).
13 Filing of Contracts by Contract Carriers by Motor Vehicle, supra note 3. The
dissenting opinion of Commissioner Lee is prophetic of the Supreme Court reasoning in
ICC v. j-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81 (1961).
14 54 Stat. 924 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 316(d), 49 Stat. 560 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 317
(1958).
15 49 Stat. 561 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 318(a) (1958).
ie Contracts of Contract Carriers, 1 M.C.C. 628, 632 (1937).
17 C. & D. Oil Co., supra note 6, at 332. The then Senator Truman later voiced
approval of this policy in 1940, when he presented a bill to amend section 203(a) (15)
of the act: "It is intended that all over-the-road truckers shall whenever possible fall
within the description of common carriers.
"It is intended by the definition of contract carriers to limit that group. . . ." 86
Cong. Rec. 11546 (1940).
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From 1935 to 1957, the ICC regarded the adequacy of existing com-
mon carrier facilities to be of high importance in determining consistency with
the public interest as defined by the history and purposes of the act. On
the basis of this principle, the Commission denied a contract carriage per-
mit when existing service was found adequate to meet the reasonable needs
of supporting shippers. The Commission placed the burden of proving the
inadequacy of existing services on the applicant." To implement this policy
of supporting the existing common carriers, the Commission made several
rulings which it used in applying the legislation to the needs of both motor
carriers and the public. In order to preserve the financial and operational
capacity of common carriers, applicants for contract carrier permits would
not be awarded business already adequately handled by existing certified
common carriers. 1° The services of a contract carrier had to be shown to be
individualized and specialized to satisfy the needs of the shippers. 2° Unless
the applicant for the permit could show that its service would be substan-
tially superior to that offered by the protesting carriers, the permits would
not be granted, even though the protestants had never undertaken the spe-
cific service in the past and there was no assurance that they would offer such
service if the permits were not granted.2 '
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court precipitated a new stage of
carrier regulation. In United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 22
 the
Court held that "a contract carrier is free to aggressively search for new
business within the limits of his license" and such action by a carrier would
not support a finding that it was " 'holding itself out to the general public' "24
as a common carrier. Thus, contract carriers (though no longer able to make
oral contracts) could engage in competition directly with common carriers
without simultaneously subjecting themselves to rate-regulation as common
carriers.
This decision prompted the ICC to seek a restrictive rewriting of sec-
tions 203(a) (15) and 209(b) of the act." The Commission feared that the
inherent advantages of contract carriers would permit them to "encroach upon
the operations of the common carriers and skim off the cream of the traf-
fic upon which they depend to support their overall service to the public." 26
The Commission, under the bill as introduced, wanted to limit the definition
15 See William Heim Cartage Co., 20 M.C.C. 329, 331 (1939).
C. & D. Oil Co., supra note 6. See also, Eastern Shore Oil Co., 7 M.C.C. 173
(1938).
20
 N. S. Craig, 31 M.C.C. 705, 710 (1941).
21 See, e.g., C. & E. Trucking Corp., 71 M.C.C. 568 (1957) Beatty Motor Express,
66 M.C.C. 160 (1955) (existing carriers should be accorded the right to transport all
traffic . . . which they can handle adequately); William Heim Cartage Co., supra
note 18, at 331 (permit denied, burden on applicant to show its service would "sub-
stantially improve" a deficiency in existing service).
22
 350 U.S. 409 (1956).
28 Id. at 412.
24 Id. at 411-12.
25 70 ICC Ann. Rep. 162-64 (1956).
26 Hearings on S. 1384 before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, on Surface Transportation-Scope of Authority of ICC, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess, 23 (1957).
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of contract carrier to one who provides services not provided by common
carriers and that existing common carriers are unwilling or unable to pro-
vicle.27 Representatives of the contract carrier industry vigorously and suc-
cessfully opposed some of the ICC's proposed amendments." The carriers
felt that the Commission requirement would place an impossible burden of
proof on them "since the state of mind of the common carriers concerning
their willingness is a matter peculiarly within their own knowledge. . ." 2"
The bill, as passed, amended the act just enough to controvert the Supreme
Court's decision in Contract Steel Carriers. 3° The amendment to Section
203 (a) (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act defines contract carriers by mo-
tor vehicle as:
•
. . . any person which engages in [motor I transportation ... under
continuing contracts with one person or a limited number of persons
either a) . . . through the assignment of motor vehicles for a con-
tinuing period of time to the exclusive use of each person served or
b) for the furnishing of transportation services designed to meet the
distinct need of each individual customer.al
Section 209(b) of the act was amended by adding a sentence which sets forth
five factors the Commission shall consider in determining whether the per-
mit should issue:
In determining whether issuance of a permit will be consistent with
the public interest and the national transportation policy .. . the
Commission shall consider the number of shippers to be served by
the applicant, the nature of the service proposed, the effect which
granting the permit would have upon the services of the protesting
carriers and the effect which denying the permit would have upon the
applicant and/or its shipper and the changing character of that
shipper's requirements. 82
The first case to arise after the amendments were passed was ICC v.
1-T Transport Co.33 The Commission continued, after the adoption of the
amendments, to place the burden of proof on the contract carrier applicant,
to show that the existing services of the common carrier were inadequate to
meet the needs of the shipper. If the applicant failed to carry the negative
burden of proof, then the Commission found that the available service was
reasonably adequate to meet the shipper's needs and denied the issuance of a
permit. This happened in the J-T Transport contract carrier application. The
27 See 70 ICC Ann. Rep., supra note 25, at 162.
28 See Rearing on S. 1384, supra note 26, at 300-05, for statement of contract
carriers' opposition.
2t' Id. at 303.
311 See S. Rep. No. 703, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 6, 7 (1957). H. Rep, No. 970, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957). As Senator Smathers said: "The decision of the Supreme
Court clearly means that the Congress should do something to correct the situation."
103 Cong. Rec. 14036 (1957).
31 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(15) (1958).
3:'
	
Stat, 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1958).
33 Supra note 13.
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district court" held erroneous a Commission decisions denying the applicant
a permit on the sole ground that the existing service was reasonably ade-
quate to meet the shipper's needs since the applicant had not shown the exist-
ing service of the other carrier to be inadequate."
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision," holding that
the Commission erred in presuming that services of existing common carriers
would be adversely affected by loss of potential traffic, even though com-
mon carriers may not have handled it before:
We see no room for a presumption in favor of, or against, any
of the five factors on which findings must be made under § 209 (b).
The effect on protesting carriers of a grant of the application and the
effect on shippers of a denial are factors to be weighed in deter-
mining on balance where the public interest lies. The aim of the 1957
amendments, as we read the legislative history, was not to protect
the status qua of existing carriers but to establish a regime under
which new contract carriage could be allowed if the "distinct need"
of shippers indicated it was desirable.
We cannot assume that Congress, in amending the statute, in-
tended to adopt the administrative construction which prevailed
prior to the amendment. 38
Furthermore,
The proper procedure ... is for the applicant first to demon-
strate that [its proposal] is specialized and tailored to a shipper's
distinct need. The protestants then may present evidence to show
they have the ability as well as the willingness to meet that special-
ized need. If that is done, then the burden shifts to the applicant
to demonstrate that it is better equipped to meet the distinct needs of
the shipper than the protestants 38
Thus, the Court said that the burden of proof was on the applicant to show
that it could meet the shipper's distinct needs and not, as previously de-
clared by the Commission, that the burden was on the applicant to show
the existing inadequacy of service. No longer was it enough for the protesting
carriers to show that they could provide reasonably adequate service; it was
now necessary for them to prove they could fill the distinct needs of the
shippers."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, felt that the third criterion (the
effect which granting the permit would have on the protesting carriers) and
the fourth (the effect of denial on the applicant and the shipper) were def-
initely not "placed in conjunctive equipoise, demanding a balance on un-
tilted scales . • [with] the fulcrum . located . . . at the 'distinct need' of
34 J-T Transport Co, v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Mo. 1960).
38 J-T Transport Co., 74 M.C.C. 324 (1958), aff'd, 79 M.C.C. 695 (1959).
36
 J-T Transport Co., 74 M.C.C., at 328.
37 MC v. J-T Transport Co., supra note 13.
38 Id. at 89.
39 Id. at 90.
4 ° Ibid.
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the shipper... ." 41 He believed that the 1957 amendments, viewed in light of
ICC precedent and the legislative history of Part II of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, had not "eliminated preference for existing common-carrier ser-
vice as a permissible determinant of Commission action."42 He construed
the amendments to have a definite and limited purpose, which was to ap-
prove and clarify the criteria adopted by the ICC in its past consideration
of such cases and which had been followed in denying the J-T Transport
application:
It would be heedless of the practicalities of legislative procedure
to assume that ... experienced committees chose to use the occasion
to overturn a consistent pattern of statutory regulation. . . . To the
contrary, it seems clear that these careful architects of motor-carrier
regulation fashioned amendments that fit harmoniously into the
prior law."
-	 The majority opinion comports with the literal terms of the amend-
ment to section 209(b) of the act, which indicates that the Commission is to
weigh the statutory factors against each individual application. This seems
to be the interpretation which would give greatest meaning to the criteria.
Assuming that Congress would not have added them to the act unless it
wished to have them applied, the majority opinion appears doubly important.
This interpretation has been accepted as the final interpretation of the mean-
ing of the law in the courts since the 1961 decision."
At issue in the instant case is the weight the Commission should give
to each of the five criteria in making its findings, i.e., on a total score basis,
weighting some of the five criteria more than others (as was done previously,
when the Commission considered the adequacy of existing service as de-
terminative), or on a point-by-point scoring system, granting each of the
criteria of section 209(b) equal weight. Viewing the history of the ICC
considerations prior to J-T Transport, the Commission felt that it had to
weight the scales in favor of the existing common carriers at the expense of
the petitioning contract carriers and their supporting shippers. The Com-
mission, reappraising the tests and reasons it used in pre-1961 contract
carrier applications, used the equal weight, point-by-point method, and
found in favor of granting the permit in four of the five criteria.
Specifically, in the Messick contract carrier application, the Commission
applied, "seriatim, the five tests enumerated in section 209(b) to the facts
involved in these proceedings." 45 (1) The number of shippers to be served:
the Commission found a grant of authority warranted here, since the
applicant served only two shippers." (2) The nature of the service proposed:
the specialized services offered by the applicant to meet the distinct needs
41 Id. at 106.
42 Id. at 115.
48 Id. at 114, 115.
44 see generally, Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, supra note 1; Colorado-
Arizona-California Express, Inc. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1963).
45 H. Messick, Inc., supra note 2, at 296.
46 Id. at 296.
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of the shipper did not warrant a grant of authority unless the standard of
proof applied by the Commission was met. Thus, a finding for the applicant
would be made only if the protestants have not "shown that they are able
and willing to meet the distinctive needs involved" and the applicant can
show "that it is better equipped to meet these distinct needs than the pro-
testants."47
 The Commission found that the applicant proposed "to
render its supporting shipper a distinctive and highly specialized service," 48
and on examining the capabilities and past performance of the protesting
carrier and the applicant, the Commission found the "evidence ... strongly
supports a grant of the authority sought by applicant."" (3) The effect
which granting the permit would have upon the services of the protesting
carriers: the Commission realized that granting the permit would probably
result in some traffic diversion away from the protesting carriers, but not
so substantially as to impair their services to the general public. On this
test, the Commission would deny the application." (4) The effect which
denying the permit would have upon the applicant and/or its shipper:
the Commission found here that the applicant would not be injured by
denial, but the shipper "would be materially and adversely affected" 51 to
such an extent that a grant of authority, in light of this fourth test,
"would be consistent with the public interest." 52 (5) The changing
character of the shipper's requirements: here the Commission found that
the shipper was in the process of developing a new product, which, though
not currently in production, would be produced with reasonable certainty
and would "result in a substantial change in the shipper's transportation
requirements."53 On this point, the Commission found in favor of granting
the permit. 54
In only one of the five tests, therefore, did the Commission find in favor
of the protesting carriers. The Commission said:
Having evaluated the pertinent evidence of record in the light of
the criteria enumerated in section 209(b), we are satisfied that the
weighing of all five factors warrants, on balance, a finding that
issuance of a permit, authorizing operations to the extent herein-
47 id. at 297.
48 Id. at 297: Applicant proposes:
(I) to assign equipment, which is especially suited to transporting explosives,
to the exclusive use of the shipper ; (2) to spot equipment at the plants prior
to loading; (3) to provide a trailer retention service at jobsite destinations for
the storage of nitro carbo nitrate; (4) to provide conveyors for loading and
unloading; (5) to conduct two-man operations with experienced drivers familiar
with the shipper's magazines who will assist in unloading; (6) to provide 10-
wheel trucks for delivery to points inaccessible to tractor-trailer units; (7) to
make dropoffs and deliveries at a definite day and hour to jobsite or magazine
locations; and (8) to furnish tank vehicles for the transportation of explosive
slurry.
49
 Id. at 300.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
83 Id. at 301.
94 Ibid.
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after indicated, will be consistent with the public interest and the
national transportation policy 6e
The district court apparently, though not expressly, agreed with the
dissenting Commissioner's opinion in the ICC report." Commissioner Bush
in his opinion, viewed section 209(b) of the act, the majority and dissenting
opinions delivered in J-T Transport, and the national transportation
policy, and felt that weighting each test equally would negate the intent
of Congress and the Supreme Court "for such a scoring system would
inevitably weigh against common carriers." 57 He favored a total scoring
system, weighting certain criteria more than others. This would follow
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent which considered the Commission's
pre-J- T Transport method of testing (giving more weight to the common
carriers' reasonably adequate service) as controlling the construction the
Court should give the 1957 amendments. The district court, in the instant
case, concurred in this:
[T]he Commission . . . erroneously assumed that these criteria
might be treated as though they were factors in an algebraic
equation which might be solved mechanically. . But we are per-
suaded by a careful reading of its opinion and the entire record
which it was considering that it attached equal weight to each
criterion, thereby employing a standard which, under the circum-
stances of this case, was not a proper one. 58
The court then remanded the proceedings to the Commission, declaring that
the Commission's order did not include an adequate statement of findings.
In an analogous problem of statutory interpretation, the district court
in P. Saldutti & Son, Inc. v. United States" held, in construing the 1957
amendment to section 203(a) (15) of the act:
It is for the Commission to determine, under the facts of each
case, whether a carrier serves a limited number of shippers. If the
findings of the Commission on this issue are supported by substantial
evidence and in accord with applicable law, this Court will not
disturb them."
" [A] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law"" is that "the
orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon
which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately
sustained."" The procedural requirements of agency findings were more
than adequately met in the instant case, for the Commission filed a lengthy
55 Ibid.
56 Id. at 304.
57 Ibid.
58 Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 907.
50 210 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.J. 1962).
60 Id. at 311.
61 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
62 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
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opinion63
 specifying the facts and considerations it deemed applicable in
reaching its conclusion.64
 Section 14(1) of the act does not require the
Commission to include detailed findings of fact in its decision except
where damages are given." Apparently, then, the court's remand was based
on a concept of the substantive law which does not follow the majority
opinion in 1-T Transport, but, instead, follows the statutory interpretation
found in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent. In the Messick application, the
ICC considered the J-T Transport Court as concluding "that it is the
responsibility of the Commission to weigh all five factors in determining
on balance where the public interest lies and not to load the scales by
attaching greater weight to one criterion than another."" It was in light
of this mandate, as the Commission saw it, that it granted the permit. Its view
is amply supported by a careful reading of the majority opinion. As Mr.
Justice Douglas said:
By adding the five criteria which it directed the Commission
to consider, Congress expressed its will that the Commission should
not manifest special solicitude for that criterion which directs
attention to the situation of protesting carriers, at the expense of that
which directs attention to the situation of supporting shippers,
when those criteria have contrary implications."
It is just such "special solicitude" that the court in the instant case is
requesting the Commission to offer. For the Commission to "judge them
with as much delicacy as the prospective nature of the inquiry permits""
it must consider the enumerated criteria seriatim, to comply with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the amendments. This is, in fact, what the
Commission did in considering the Messick application and issuing the permit
on the basis of its "equal weight" point-by-point scoring system. The
Commission's method of implementing J-T Transport, as evidenced in the
instant case, is clearly the most logical method of evaluating the 1957
statutory requirements: The Commission's procedures and methods of
weighing the five criteria, therefore, should prevail over the more limited
construction which the district court placed upon the amendments to section
209(b).
MRS. CRYSTAL J. LLOYD
63 H. Messick, Inc., 92 M.C.C. 293 (1963). The Commission examined some criteria
in more detail than others, but they made findings on each one with record evidence that
would tend to support the findings. In fact, the amount of detail the Commission
recorded in the instant case, is quite consistent with some of the other contract carrier
applications the Commission has weighed since the J-T Transport decision. See Griffin
Mobile Home Transp. Co., 91 M.C.C. 801 (1963) ; Carlton M. Moyer, 88 M.C.C. 767
(1962).
64 See also, Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 614, 621 (D.D.C. 1951).
65 54 Stat. 911 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 14(1) (1958). See Alabama Great Southern
R.R. v. United States, 340 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1951).
co H. Messick, Inc., supra note 63, at 296.
67 ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81, 89 (1961).
68 Ibid.
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